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agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous expectations-based reference point, 
responds negatively to her rival's effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement 
effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment 
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The sudden disappointment of a hope leaves a scar which the ultimate ful¯llment of that hope
never entirely removes.1
England fullback Delon Armitage is determined to put his misery at being overlooked by
the British & Irish Lions behind him when he runs out to face Argentina at Old Tra®ord on
Saturday ... The occasion will not be lost on Armitage, although he is struggling to get past
the disappointment of missing out on a Lions call after an excellent ¯rst Test season ... `I was
really, really disappointed about it,' he said. `I still need to get over it a little bit.' 2
1 Introduction
Disappointment at doing worse than expected can be a powerful emotion. This emotion may
be particularly intense when the disappointed agent exerted e®ort in competing for a prize,
thus raising her expectation of winning. Furthermore, a rational agent who anticipates possible
disappointment will optimize taking into account the expected disappointment arising from her
choice.
In this paper we use a laboratory experiment to test whether agents are disappointment
averse when they compete in a real e®ort tournament. In particular, we test whether our
subjects are loss averse around reference points given by endogenous expectations. Pairs of
subjects complete a novel computerized real e®ort task, called the \slider task", which involves
moving sliders across a screen. The First Mover completes the task, followed by the Second
Mover, who observes the First Mover's e®ort before choosing how hard to work.3 A money
prize is awarded to one of the pair members based on the pair's relative work e®orts and some
element of chance which we control. After each repetition, the subjects are re-paired. If agents
care only about money and the cost of e®ort then the Second Mover's work e®ort should not
depend on the e®ort of the First Mover. However, as predicted by our theory of disappointment,
the experimental data show a discouragement e®ect : the Second Mover shies away from working
hard when she observes that the First Mover has worked hard, and tends to work relatively hard
when she observes that her competitor has put in low e®ort.
Our contribution is three-fold: methodological; theoretical; and empirical. From a method-
ological perspective, we develop a novel real e®ort task designed to facilitate robust statistical
inference. Early experiments implementing costly activities used a monetary cost function which
mimics e®ort by specifying output as a function of how much money subjects contribute (e.g.,
Bull et al., 1987, in a tournament context). Increasingly, laboratory experiments have featured
real e®ort tasks.4 Real e®ort generates greater external validity, but makes precise quanti¯cation
di±cult (Falk and Fehr, 2003). The main advantage of our slider task is that it allows a ¯ne
and accurate measure of e®ort over a short time scale. Thus we interpret performance in the
task as e®ort exerted and we can use repeated observations of the same subjects to control for
1Thomas Hardy, as quoted by Gibson (1996, p. 74).
2ESPN Scrum, 4 June 2009, www.scrum.com/england/rugby/story/97635.html
3We use a sequential tournament to give clean identi¯cation, rather than because most competitive situations
involve sequential e®ort choices.
4See Section 2.1.2 for examples of di®erent real e®ort tasks. Recently experiments involving real e®ort tour-
naments have become popular (e.g., van Dijk et al., 2001; Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007;
Carpenter et al., 2007; Charness and Villeval, 2009).
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learning-by-doing and persistent unobserved heterogeneity. We believe that our task will prove
valuable to researchers in designing future experiments with real e®ort.
From a theoretical perspective, we extend disappointment aversion to situations in which
agents compete. Existing models of disappointment aversion (e.g., Bell, 1985; Loomes and
Sugden, 1986; Gul, 1991; Shalev, 2000; Delqui¶e and Cillo, 2006a, 2006b; K}oszegi and Rabin,
2006, 2007) build on the idea that agents are sensitive to deviations from what they expected to
receive. We model disappointment aversion as loss aversion around an agent's expected payo®,
so losses relative to this expectation are more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasurable.5 In
our competitive framework, this expected payo® is determined endogenously by the agents' e®ort
choices. Thus we model agents as holding reference-dependent preferences with an endogenous
reference point given by choice-acclimating (K}oszegi and Rabin, 2007) expectations, and we
assume that agents anticipate the impact of e®ort on their reference point.
Our theory predicts an empirically testable discouragement e®ect whereby the Second Mover
responds negatively to the First Mover's e®ort. Thus First and Second Movers' e®orts are
strategic substitutes. This discouragement e®ect becomes more powerful in the strength of
disappointment aversion, measured by the size of the kink in utility induced by loss aversion,
and in the value of the prize. A disappointment averse Second Mover becomes discouraged even
though we impose probabilities of winning the prize which are linear in the di®erence in the
agents' e®orts, so that, in the canonical tournament model with a separable cost of e®ort, the
First Mover's e®ort has no e®ect on the Second Mover's marginal incentives. Note that the
endogeneity of the reference point is crucial. Most of the literature on loss aversion assumes a
¯xed reference point, but with such a reference point, even if given by a prior expectation, the
standard model predicts no discouragement e®ect.
From an empirical perspective, we o®er evidence of disappointment aversion from a linear
random e®ects panel regression and from structural estimation using the Method of Simulated
Moments. We ¯nd signi¯cant evidence of disappointment aversion. The reduced form analysis
shows that subjects' behavior in our experiment is inconsistent with the standard model, but
instead exhibits the discouragement e®ect predicted by our theory of disappointment. Addition-
ally, we use structural modeling to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average
and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population. Both estimation meth-
ods exploit identifying variation obtained from the properties of the slider task together with
our experimental design. Speci¯cally, the value of the prize is drawn randomly each time a First
and Second Mover are paired, while the ¯neness of our measure of e®ort allows us to observe
precisely how Second Movers respond to the prize and the e®ort choice of the First Mover they
are paired with.
Our empirical results address two important open questions in the literature on reference-
dependent preferences: (i) what constitutes agents' reference points?; and (ii) how quickly do
these reference points adjust to new circumstances? Our analysis provides evidence that when
agents compete they have reference points given by their expected monetary payo® and that an
agent's reference point adjusts essentially instantaneously to her own e®ort choice and that of
5Loss aversion is a fundamental component of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s Prospect Theory. Kahneman
and Tversky (2000) collect a number of papers providing empirical support for loss aversion in numerous di®erent
contexts, while DellaVigna (2009) surveys some more recent evidence.
2
others.
Our work is complementary to that of Abeler et al. (2009) and Crawford and Meng (2009)
who also ¯nd evidence for expectations-based reference-dependent preferences in the context of
e®ort provision. Abeler et al. run a laboratory experiment with a non-competitive design in
which subjects have a 50% chance of being paid piece-rate and a 50% chance of receiving a ¯xed
payment, and show that e®ort increases in the ¯xed payment. Abeler et al. do not estimate any
structural parameters, while we are able to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion.
Crawford and Meng use ¯eld data on taxi driver labor supply to estimate the strength of loss
aversion around rational expectations-based daily income and hours targets.6 In contrast to
our model, the reference point is taken to be ¯xed when the agent chooses how hard to work.
Our paper is also related to the existing empirical literature on disappointment aversion in the
absence of e®ort provision. A number of papers test for disappointment aversion using choices
over, or bids for, lotteries. Loomes and Sugden (1987) provide an early example, while recent
instances include Choi et al. (2007) and Sonsino (2008).
Finally, the psychology literature also supports the thesis that agents' emotional responses
to the outcomes of gambles include disappointment and elation, that agents anticipate these
emotions when choosing between gambles and that exerting e®ort, by increasing the likelihood
of a good outcome, intensi¯es disappointment (Mellers et al., 1999; van Dijk et al., 1999).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the slider task and the
design of the experiment. Section 3 develops our theory of disappointment aversion when agents
compete. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A derives
proofs not included in the main text. Appendix B provides further details about the structural
estimation method and the model's goodness of ¯t. Finally, Appendix C lays out the instructions
provided to the experimental subjects.
2 Experimental Design
We ran 6 experimental sessions at the Nu±eld Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS)
in Oxford, all conducted on weekdays at the same time of day in late February and early
March 2009 and lasting approximately 90 minutes.7 20 student subjects (who did not report
Psychology or Economics as their main subject of study) participated in each session, with 120
participants in total. The subjects were drawn from the CESS subject pool which is managed
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). The experimental
instructions (Appendix C) were provided to each subject in written form and were read aloud
to the subjects. Seating positions were randomized. To ensure subject-experimenter anonymity,
actions and payments were linked to randomly allocated Participant ID numbers. Each subject
was paid a show-up fee of $4 and earned an average of a further $10 during the experiment (all
payments were in Pounds sterling). At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to report
their gender (but could withhold this information). Subjects were paid privately in cash by the
laboratory administrator. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
6Camerer et al. (1997) and Doran (2009) also ¯nd evidence of taxi driver loss aversion.
7We also ran one pilot session without any monetary incentives whose results are not reported here.
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2.1 The Slider Task
Before setting out the experimental procedure, we ¯rst describe the novel computerized real
e®ort task, which we call the \slider task", that we designed for the purpose of this experiment
and explain its advantages in relation to the existing stock of real e®ort tasks.
2.1.1 Description of the Slider Task
The slider task consists of a single screen displaying a number of sliders. The number and position
of the sliders on the screen does not vary across experimental subjects or across repetitions of
the task. A schematic representation of a single slider is shown in Figure 1. When the screen
containing the e®ort task is ¯rst displayed to the subject all of the sliders are positioned at 0, as
shown for a single slider in Figure 1(a). By using the mouse, the subject can position each slider
at any integer location between 0 and 100 inclusive. Each slider can be adjusted and readjusted
an unlimited number of times and the current position of each slider is displayed to the right of
the slider. The subject's \points score" in the task is the number of sliders positioned at 50 at
the end of the allotted time. As explained in Section 2.1.2, we interpret a subject's point score as
e®ort exerted in the task. Figure 1(b) shows a correctly positioned slider. As the task proceeds,
the screen displays the subject's current points score and the amount of time remaining.
(a) Initial position. (b) Positioned at 50.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a slider.
The number of sliders and task length can be chosen by the experimenter. In this experiment
we used 48 sliders and an allotted time of 120 seconds. The sliders were displayed on 22 inch
widescreen monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. To move the sliders, the subjects
used 800 dpi USB mice with the scroll wheel disabled.8 Figure 2 shows a screen of sliders as
shown to the subject in the laboratory. In this example, the subject has positioned three of the
sliders at 50 and a points score of 3 is shown at the top of the screen. A fourth slider is currently
positioned at 33 and this slider does not contribute to the subject's points score as it is not
positioned correctly. To ensure that all the sliders are equally di±cult to position correctly, the
48 sliders are arranged on the screen such that no two sliders are aligned exactly one under the
other. This prevents the subject being able to position the higher slider at 50 and then easily
position the lower slider by copying the position of the higher slider.
2.1.2 Advantages of the Slider Task
The slider task has a number of desirable attributes. First, the slider task is simple to commu-
nicate and to understand, and does not require or test pre-existing knowledge. Second, unlike
solving mathematical problems (Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003), counting, decoding or
8The keyboards were also disabled to prevent the subjects using the arrow keys to position the sliders.
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Notes: The screen presented here is slightly squarer than the one seen by our subjects.
Figure 2: Screen showing 48 sliders.
entering strings of characters (Chow, 1983), solving word games (Burrows and Loomes, 1994),
answering general knowledge questions (Ho®man et al., 1994), negotiating mazes (Gneezy et al.,
2003) or performing numerical optimization (van Dijk et al., 2001), the slider task is identical
across repetitions. Third, the task allows a ¯ne measure of performance and involves little ran-
domness, so the number of correctly positioned sliders corresponds closely to the e®ort exerted
by the subject. Thus we interpret a subject's point score as e®ort exerted in the task. Fourth,
there is no scope for guessing, which complicates the design and interpretation of some existing
tasks such as those based on counting characters or numerical optimization.
These attributes are also shared by the envelope ¯lling task (Konow, 2000), in which subjects
stu® real envelopes with letters. Crucially, however, the slider task allows a ¯ne measure of e®ort
within a short time scale. Furthermore, because the task is computerized, it is easy to implement
and allows °exible real-time subject interactions. In Section 4 we see that with 48 sliders and
an allotted time of 120 seconds, measured e®ort varies from 0 to over 40. Thus substantial
variation in behavior can be observed, and by getting subjects to repeat the identical task many
times the experimenter can control for persistent unobserved heterogeneity using panel data
methods. This allows robust statistical inference. For example, we use repeated observations
of the same subjects to estimate the distribution of e®ort costs, enabling structural estimation
of the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment
aversion across the population. Thus the task's design overcomes the principal drawback of
5
using real e®ort up to now, namely that \Since the experimenter does not know the workers'
e®ort cost, it is not possible to derive precise quantitative predictions" (Falk and Fehr, 2003, p.
404).
2.2 Experimental Procedure
In every session 10 subjects were told that they would be a \First Mover" and the other 10 that
they would be a \Second Mover" for the duration of the session. Each session consisted of 2
practice rounds followed by 10 paying rounds.
In every paying round, each First Mover was paired anonymously with a Second Mover.
Each pair's prize was chosen randomly from f$0:10;$0:20; :::;$3:90g and revealed to the pair
members. The First and Second Movers then completed our slider task sequentially, with the
Second Mover discovering the points score of the First Mover she was paired with before starting
the task. As explained in Section 2.1.1, we used a slider task with 48 sliders and an allotted
time of 120 seconds. During the task, a number of pieces of information appeared at the top of
the subject's screen: the round number; the time remaining; whether the subject was a First or
Second Mover; the prize for the round; and the subject's points score in the task so far. If the
subject was a Second Mover, she also saw the points score of the First Mover. Figure 2 provides
an example of the screen visible to the Second Movers.
The probability of winning the prize for each pair member was 50 plus her own points score
minus the other pair member's points score, all divided by 100. Thus, we imposed winning
probabilities linear in the di®erence of the points scores, with equal points scores giving equal
winning probabilities, while an increase of 1 in the di®erence raised the chance of winning by 1
percentage point for the pair member with the higher points score. The probability of winning
function was explained verbally and using Table 6. At the end of the round, the subjects saw
a summary screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's points score, their
probability of winning the prize given the respective points scores, the prize for the round and
whether they were the winner or loser of the prize in that round.
After each paying round the subjects were re-paired according to Cooper et al. (1996)'s \no
contagion" matching algorithm (as used recently by, e.g., Dal B¶o, 2005). This rotation-based
algorithm ensures that not only do the same subjects never meet each other more than once,
but that each round is truly one-shot in the sense that a given subject's actions in one round
cannot in°uence, either directly or indirectly, the actions of other subjects that the subject is
paired with later on. The explanation to the subjects in the experimental instructions provides
further detail.
Before starting the paying rounds, the subjects played 2 practice rounds to gain familiarity
with the task and procedure and to give opportunities for questions. To prevent contamination
the subjects were made aware that during the practice rounds they were playing against au-
tomata who behaved randomly. At the end of each practice round, the subjects were informed
of what their probability of winning would have been given the respective points scores, but
were not told that they had won or lost in that round, and no prizes were awarded. We do not
include the practice rounds in the econometric analysis.
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3 Theoretical Predictions
In this Section we provide a theoretical model of the behavior of a generic pair of First and
Second Movers competing for a prize v in a particular round. After describing the model, we
show that in the absence of disappointment aversion the Second Mover's e®ort does not depend
on the First Mover's e®ort, while a disappointment averse Second Mover will respond negatively
to the e®ort choice of the First Mover.
3.1 One-Shot Theory Model
Two agents compete to win a ¯xed prize of monetary value v > 0 in a rank-order tournament,
choosing their e®ort levels sequentially. The First Mover chooses her e®ort level e1 from an
action space A µ [0; e] which can be discrete or continuous. The Second Mover observes e1
before choosing her e®ort level e2 from A. As noted in Section 2.1.2, we interpret a subject's
points score in the slider task as e®ort exerted. Agent i's probability of winning the prize
Pi(ei; ej) increases linearly in the di®erence between her own e®ort, ei, and the other agent's
e®ort, ej . Assuming symmetry of the probability of winning functions,
Pi(ei; ej) = ei ¡ ej + °2° ; (1)
with ° ¸ e to ensure that Pi 2 [0; 1].9 Throughout we focus on the behavior of the Second
Mover conditional on the First Mover's e®ort e1.
3.2 No Disappointment Aversion
Applying the canonical model in the tournament literature, the Second Mover's utility U2 is
separable into utility u2(y2) from her tournament payo® y2 2 f0; vg, which we call her material
utility, and her cost of e®ort C2(e2),10 so
U2(y2; e2) = u2(y2)¡ C2(e2): (2)
The underlying assumption is that because the (non-monetary) e®ort cost is sunk before the
winner of the tournament is determined, the e®ort choice does not a®ect risk preferences over the
monetary payo® from the tournament. Separability implies that the Second Mover's expected
utility is given by
EU2(e2; e1) = P2(e2; e1)u2(v) + (1¡ P2(e2; e1))u2(0)¡ C2(e2)
= (u2(v)¡ u2(0))
µe2 ¡ e1 + °
2°
¶
+ u2(0)¡ C2(e2): (3)
As the winning probabilities are linear in the di®erence in e®orts, the First Mover's e®ort e1 has
no e®ect on the marginal impact of the Second Mover's e®ort e2 on her probability of winning.
9Che and Gale (2000) call this a piece-wise linear di®erence-form success function.
10In their related work, Abeler et al. (2009) and Crawford and Meng (2009) make equivalent separability
assumptions.
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Thus the Second Mover's marginal utility with respect to her own e®ort does not depend on e1,
giving the following result.
Proposition 1 In the absence of disappointment aversion the Second Mover's optimal e®ort e¤2
(or set of optimal e®orts) does not depend on the First Mover's e®ort e1.
Note that we have not imposed any concavity or di®erentiability assumptions on u2(y2) (and
nor have we assumed anything about the shape of C2(e2)). Thus the result continues to hold
if the Second Mover is loss averse around a ¯xed reference point (Section 3.3 elaborates) or
exhibits any degree of risk aversion over her monetary payo®. The result also holds if u2(y2)
incorporates an impact of winning or losing on the utility function in any later tournaments,
e.g., via changes in wealth or the reference point.
3.3 Disappointment Aversion
Models of disappointment aversion (e.g., Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Gul, 1991;
Shalev, 2000; Delqui¶e and Cillo, 2006a, 2006b; K}oszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) build on the
idea that agents are sensitive to deviations from their expectations, su®ering a psychological
loss when they receive less than expected and experiencing elation when they receive more.
Furthermore, agents anticipate these losses and gains when deciding how to behave.
We follow most of the literature in embedding disappointment aversion in a loss aversion-
type framework.11 Suppose that the Second Mover compares her material utility u2(y2) to a
reference level of utility R2, su®ering losses when u2(y2) is less than this reference point and
enjoying gains when u2(y2) exceeds the reference point. Speci¯cally, total utility U2 is given by
U2(y2; R2; e2) = u2(y2) + 1u2(y2)¸R2G2(u2(y2)¡R2) + 1u2(y2)·R2L2(u2(y2)¡R2)¡C2(e2); (4)
where the loss function L2(x) < 0 for x < 0, the gain function G2(x) ¸ 0 for x > 0 and
G2(0) = L2(0) = 0. The utility arising from the comparison of u2(y2) to the reference point is
termed gain-loss utility. The Second Mover is said to be loss averse if losses due to downward
departures from the reference point are more painful than equal-sized upward departures are
pleasurable, i.e., G2(x) < jL2(¡x)j for all x > 0. The Second Mover is ¯rst-order loss averse
if she is loss averse in the limit as the deviations from the reference point go to zero, i.e.,
limx"0 L02(x) > limx#0 G02(x), assuming di®erentiability of gain-loss utility except at the kink
where x = 0.
By modeling each tournament as a one-shot interaction, we are assuming that our subjects
frame each tournament narrowly, i.e., they compare the outcome of each tournament to their
reference point in isolation. Models and tests of loss aversion generally incorporate narrow
framing, either implicitly or explicitly (DellaVigna, 2009). Barberis et al. (2006) provide evidence
that attitudes towards small gambles can only be explained by ¯rst-order loss aversion together
11Instead, Gul (1991) uses probability weighting, while Loomes and Sugden (1986) insist on the di®erentiability
of utility. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s Prospect Theory incorporates a loss averse value function de¯ned
only over losses and gains relative to the reference point, while we follow the disappointment aversion literature
in de¯ning total utility over both material utility and gain-loss utility arising from the comparison of material
utility to the reference point.
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with the narrow framing of individual gambles, while Read et al. (1999) survey the broader
evidence on narrow framing.
Starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most models of loss aversion take the reference
point to be ¯xed exogenously, for example assuming it to be equal to the status quo. We noted
above that the utility formulation (2) is °exible enough to incorporate loss aversion around a
¯xed reference point. Thus, an exogenous reference point does not introduce any interdependence
between the e®orts of the First and Second Movers (to see that Proposition 1 continues to hold,
note that if u2(y2) in (2) is rede¯ned to include gain-loss utility, the analysis proceeds as before).
Instead of holding an exogenous reference point, we assume that a disappointment averse
Second Mover is loss averse around an endogenous reference point equal to her expected material
utility given the e®ort levels that are actually chosen,12 so
R2 = E[u2(y2)je2; e1]: (5)
Thus a Second Mover's reference point will be sensitive to both the e®ort chosen by the First
Mover and her own e®ort, and when optimizing the Second Mover understands that her e®ort
choice a®ects her reference point. Notice that the endogeneity of the expectation is crucial. If
the Second Mover starts with a reference point equal to a prior expectation which is invariant
to the e®ort levels that are actually chosen, the reference point is ¯xed so, as explained above,
Proposition 1 still holds. Instead, our reference point adjusts to the agents' choices: in the
terminology of K}oszegi and Rabin (2007) the reference point is choice-acclimating.13
To operationalize our model, we linearize material utility and gain-loss utility.14 We assume
that u2(y2) = y2, so material utility is linear in money and the Second Mover's reference point
becomes her expected monetary payo®, i.e.,
R2 = vP2(e2; e1): (6)
Furthermore, we assume that the gain-loss utility arising from the comparison of u2(y2) to the
reference point is piece-wise linear, with a constant slope of g2 in the gain domain and l2 in the
loss domain. With piece-wise linearity, loss aversion implies that l2 > g2, so losses are more
painful than same-sized gains are pleasurable.15 Thus we de¯ne disappointment aversion as
follows.
12In a single agent set-up, Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) also use a reference point equal to
expected material utility given the chosen action. Delqui¶e and Cillo (2006a, 2006b) and K}oszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) argue that in a stochastic environment, the reference point itself should be taken to be a lottery, with an
agent comparing the outcome to all the possible outcomes in the reference lottery and weighting each comparison
by the probability of the relevant reference outcome. It is straightforward to show that in the linear environment
considered below the reference lottery approach collapses to our single reference point set-up.
13Technically our game is psychological (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) as the Second Mover's utility depends on
her beliefs about the chosen e®orts via the reference point. In particular, our game falls under Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2009)'s framework of a dynamic psychological game as utility depends on terminal node (ex post)
beliefs, which are pinned down by the chosen e®orts, so beliefs can update during the course of the game. In
K}oszegi and Rabin (2006), by contrast, utilities depend only on initial beliefs as the reference point is given by a
prior expectation which does not update in response to the chosen action (although an equilibrium consistency
requirement is imposed on the expectation).
14Given the experimental stakes are small, we believe this comes at a low cost.
15With piece-wise linearity, loss aversion and ¯rst-order loss aversion are equivalent. If l2 = g2, gains and losses
relative to the reference point cancel out in expectation, so the agent acts as if she had standard preferences.
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De¯nition 1 A disappointment averse Second Mover is loss averse around her expected mone-
tary payo®, so ¸2 ´ l2¡ g2, which measures the strength of disappointment aversion, is strictly
positive.
We can then express a disappointment averse Second Mover's expected utility as16
EU2(e2; e1) = P2(v + g2(v ¡ vP2)) + (1¡ P2)(0 + l2(0¡ vP2))¡ C2(e2)
= vP2 ¡ ¸2vP2(1¡ P2)¡ C2(e2); (7)
and we let
¤2(e2 ¡ e1) ´ ¡¸2vP2(1¡ P2) (8)
represent the extra term introduced into expected utility by disappointment aversion. (Recall
from Section 3.2 that loss aversion around a ¯xed reference point, including one given by a prior
expectation, or risk aversion in the absence of an endogenous reference point do not introduce
a similar term.)
We call ¤2 the Second Mover's disappointment de¯cit as it is always negative for ¸2 > 0
(strictly negative for Pi =2 f0; 1g): a disappointment averse Second Mover dislikes variance in
her monetary payo® as losses relative to her expected payo® loom larger than gains. (With
risk aversion, agents care only about their probability of winning as there are only two possible
outcomes.) The variance of the Second Mover's two-point distribution of monetary payo®s is
given by vP2(1 ¡ P2), which is strictly concave in P2 and maximized at P2 = 12 , so given the
linearity of P2 in e2 ¡ e1 the disappointment de¯cit is strictly convex in the di®erence in e®orts
and at its most negative where the e®orts are equal.
When e®orts are such that the Second Mover has zero probability of winning, the Second
Mover has a reference point of zero and her realized payo® equals her reference point; she is
never disappointed and never receives more than expected. Hence her disappointment de¯cit is
zero. Starting at zero, a small increase in her probability of winning leads to a large increase in
the variance of her monetary payo®. Further increases in the probability of winning towards 12
lead to further yet smaller increases in the variance. At P2 = 12 the variance is at its highest so
the disappointment de¯cit is at its most negative - irrespective of whether she wins or loses the
Second Mover's realized payo® is very di®erent from her expected payo®. Starting at P2 = 12
increases in the probability of winning reduce the variance, initially by small amounts, and then
by larger amounts as the probability of winning approaches 1.
The convexity of the disappointment de¯cit is critical to understanding how the Second
Mover responds to the First Mover's e®ort choice. For any value of the Second Mover's e®ort,
an increase in the First Mover's e®ort reduces the Second Mover's probability of winning. This
puts the Second Mover at a point on her disappointment de¯cit curve with a lower slope (less
positive or more negative) so the Second Mover's e®ort has a smaller (again less positive or
more negative) e®ect on the disappointment de¯cit, and hence the Second Mover has a lower
16In the context of desert preferences, whereby an agent's expectation represents how much she feels she deserves
given how hard she was worked in comparison to her rival, Gill and Stone (2009) derive an equivalent formulation
which they use to analyze simultaneous e®ort choices in a purely theoretical framework. Gill and Stone permit
g2 < 0 to model agents who feel guilty about doing better than deserved. All of our theoretical and empirical
analysis continues to hold if we allow g2 < 0 here.
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marginal incentive to exert e®ort. We thus have a discouragement e®ect, which is crucial to our
identi¯cation strategy: a disappointment averse Second Mover responds negatively to the First
Mover's e®ort, so the harder the First Mover works the more the Second Mover shies away from
exerting e®ort. Thus First and Second Mover e®orts are strategic substitutes.17
Proposition 2 When the Second Mover is disappointment averse, higher First Mover e®ort
discourages the Second Mover: the Second Mover's optimal e®ort e¤2 is always (weakly) decreasing
in the First Mover's e®ort e1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Up to now we have imposed no assumptions on the shape of the cost of e®ort function. In
order to derive an analytical expression for how the Second Mover responds to the First Mover's
e®ort, and to see how the slope of the reaction function changes in the value of the prize and
the strength of disappointment aversion, we now assume a quadratic cost of e®ort function:
C2(e2) = be2 + ce
2
2
2 : (9)
With this cost function, the Second Mover's objective function will be everywhere convex or
everywhere concave. With strict convexity, the Second Mover will always set e®ort at a corner.
Instead we focus here on the case of strict concavity, which allows interior optima, showing that
the discouragement e®ect becomes stronger as the Second Mover becomes more disappointment
averse or the value of the prize goes up.
Proposition 3 Suppose a disappointment averse Second Mover has a quadratic cost function
(given by (9)) and a strictly concave objective function, i.e., 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0. When the action
space is continuous, the slope of the Second Mover's reaction function in the interior is given by
de¤2
de1 =
¡¸2v
2°2c¡ ¸2v < 0 (10)
which becomes strictly more negative in the strength of disappointment aversion ¸2 and the value
of the prize v. When the action space is discrete, the discrete analogue of the reaction function
behaves similarly.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
These e®ects are intuitive. Referring back to (8) we see that the disappointment de¯cit term
becomes more negative in the strength of disappointment aversion ¸2 and the value of the prize
v. The variance of the monetary payo® goes up in the size of the prize, and the stronger is
disappointment aversion, the greater the weight put on this variance.
17It is straightforward to extend the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if ¸2 were negative, the Second Mover
would respond positively to the First Mover's e®ort.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Overview and Sample Description
We use the data set collected from the laboratory experiment described in Section 2 to test our
theory of disappointment aversion. In Section 4.2 we show in a reduced form setting that, as pre-
dicted by our theory of disappointment aversion, Second Movers respond negatively to the e®ort
choice of the First Mover they are paired with and that the strength of this e®ect is increasing
in the value of the prize. In Section 4.3 we use structural modeling to estimate the strength
of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across
the population. As outlined in the Introduction, our estimation strategies exploit identifying
variation obtained from the properties of our slider task together with the experimental design.
In Section 4.4 we discuss how our results provide evidence for endogenous choice-acclimating
reference points and we relate our estimate of the disappointment aversion parameter to existing
estimates of loss aversion.
We analyze the behavior of Second Movers conditional on the e®ort choices of the First
Movers. This conditional analysis is su±cient for the purpose of identifying the presence and
strength of disappointment aversion. Moreover, solving for the optimal behavior of the First
Movers requires further assumptions concerning the First Movers' beliefs about the unobserved
characteristics and behavior of the Second Movers. We avoid these issues, together with the as-
sociated computational complexities and potential sources of misspeci¯cation, when performing
a conditional analysis of the Second Mover e®ort choices.
As noted in Section 2.1.1, we interpret the number of sliders correctly positioned within the
allotted time, i.e., the points score, as the e®ort exerted by the subject. We comment here on
two features of this e®ort measure. First, as explained in Section 2.1.2, the design of our slider
task ensures that points scores correspond closely to e®ort exerted. Second, while the slider task
provides a ¯ne measure of e®ort, e®ort is still discrete. We emphasize that this discreteness is
entirely unproblematic. Indeed, the above theoretical framework encompasses both discrete and
continuous e®ort choices, and the testable implications of our theory of disappointment aversion
apply irrespective of whether e®ort is discrete or continuous. In addition, as explained below,
discrete e®ort choices are easily accommodated in our structural model.
From the laboratory sessions we collected data on 60 First Movers and 60 Second Movers,
each observed for 10 paying rounds, with re-pairing between rounds as detailed in Section 2.2.
One Second Mover appears to have been unable to position any sliders at exactly 50 and this
subject is dropped from our preferred sample.18 However, we show that our results are robust
to our sample selection. Table 1 summarizes the behavior of the 59 Second Movers and the
corresponding First Movers in each round. E®orts range between 0 and 41 sliders for First
Movers and 0 and 40 sliders for Second Movers. Within each round, on average First and
Second Movers exert roughly the same e®ort, with average e®ort increasing from around 22
sliders to just under 27 sliders over the 10 rounds.
18The data show that this subject was moving sliders around throughout the session but failed to position any
sliders at exactly 50 in either the practice rounds or in the paying rounds. This subject also experienced problems
when entering his/her Participant ID number.
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Paying Mean(e1) SD(e1) Mean(e2) SD(e2)
Minimum Maximum
Round e1 e2 e1 e2
1 22.034 5.991 21.763 6.101 1 0 33 34
2 22.627 6.708 23.458 4.836 0 11 33 33
3 24.763 6.075 24.831 4.875 0 12 37 38
4 24.627 5.956 25.203 4.502 0 16 35 36
5 24.966 6.800 25.119 5.660 0 0 36 35
6 24.729 7.508 24.898 7.039 1 0 37 39
7 25.881 5.855 25.763 6.109 9 0 37 37
8 26.831 5.858 26.169 5.133 9 14 41 35
9 25.593 8.550 26.254 6.702 0 0 38 40
10 26.322 6.781 26.729 5.988 1 0 40 39
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation and e1 and e2 denote, respectively, First and Second Mover e®ort.
Table 1: Summary of First and Second Mover e®orts.
4.2 Reduced Form Analysis
We use a panel data regression to examine whether Second Movers respond to the e®ort choice
of the First Mover they are paired with. Exploiting Proposition 1, we hypothesize that if Second
Movers are not disappointment averse then the observed e®orts of the Second Movers will not
depend on the corresponding First Mover e®orts once controls for the prize and round e®ects
are included.19 Alternatively, if subjects are disappointment averse then Proposition 2 implies a
negative dependence of observed Second Mover e®orts on the corresponding First Mover e®orts,
again conditional on controls for the prize and round e®ects.
To explore how Second Movers respond to First Mover e®ort we estimate the following linear
random e®ects panel data model:
e2;n;r = ¯1+¯2vn;r+¯3e1;n;r+¯4e1;n;r£vn;r+dr+!n+²n;r for n = 1; : : : ; N ; r = 1; :::; 10; (11)
where n and r index, respectively, Second Movers and paying rounds, and N denotes the total
number of Second Movers. e1;n;r is the e®ort of the First Mover paired with the nth Second
Mover in the rth round, and vn;r is the prize draw for the nth Second Mover in the rth round.
The prize, the First Mover's e®ort and the First Mover's e®ort interacted with the prize are
included as explanatory variables. The inclusion of the interaction of the prize and the First
Mover's e®ort is motivated by Proposition 3 which shows that in the case of a quadratic cost
of e®ort function the negative e®ect of the First Mover's e®ort on the Second Mover's optimal
e®ort is larger at higher prizes. Additionally, the equation includes a set of round dummies
denoted by dr for r = 1; :::; 10, with the ¯rst paying round providing the omitted category, to
capture systematic di®erences between rounds which are common across Second Movers, and
round invariant Second Mover speci¯c e®ects denoted !n for n = 1; : : : ; N to capture systematic
19We note however that First and Second Mover e®orts will not be unconditionally independent in the presence
of prize and round e®ects which impact on both pair members.
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di®erences between Second Movers. Lastly, ²n;r is an unobservable that varies over rounds and
over Second Movers and captures di®erences between rounds in a Second Mover's e®ort choice
that cannot be attributed to the other terms in the model. !n is assumed to be identically and
independently distributed over Second Movers with a variance ¾2!, while ²n;r is assumed to be
identically and independently distributed over rounds and Second Movers with a variance ¾2² .
Preferred Sample Full Sample
59 Second Movers 60 Second Movers
Coe±cient z value
(p value)
Coe±cient z value
(p value)
First Mover e®ort 0:044 0:898
(0:369)
0.047 0:963
(0:336)
Prize 1:639¤¤¤ 2:724
(0:006)
1:655¤¤¤ 2:794
(0:005)
Prize£First Mover e®ort ¡0:049¤¤ ¡2:083
(0:037)
¡0:050¤¤ ¡2:179
(0:029)
d2 1:689¤¤ 2:381(0:017) 1:655
¤¤ 2:368
(0:018)
d3 3:084¤¤¤ 4:325(0:000) 3:034
¤¤¤ 4:323
(0:000)
d4 3:448¤¤¤ 4:838(0:000) 3:369
¤¤¤ 4:801
(0:000)
d5 3:322¤¤¤ 4:650(0:000) 3:279
¤¤¤ 4:661
(0:000)
d6 3:262¤¤¤ 4:577(0:000) 3:193
¤¤¤ 4:554
(0:000)
d7 4:123¤¤¤ 5:756(0:000) 4:043
¤¤¤ 5:734
(0:000)
d8 4:567¤¤¤ 6:341(0:000) 4:487
¤¤¤ 6:330
(0:000)
d9 4:709¤¤¤ 6:582(0:000) 4:632
¤¤¤ 6:579
(0:000)
d10 5:180¤¤¤ 7:148(0:000) 5:066
¤¤¤ 7:115
(0:000)
Intercept 19:777¤¤¤ 14:126
(0:000)
19:392¤¤¤ 13:400
(0:000)
¾! 4.288 5.342
¾² 3.852 3.826
N £R 590 600
Â2 test for no signi¯cant 4.16 2.94
di®erence between men and women df = 3; p = 0:242 df = 3; p = 0:235
Hausman test for random 2.43 2.43
versus ¯xed e®ects df = 12; p = 0:998 df = 12; p = 0:998
Notes: ¤, ¤¤ and ¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. df denotes degrees of freedom.
Table 2: Random e®ects regressions for Second Mover e®ort.
Table 2 reports estimates of the parameters appearing in (11). The results for the preferred
sample show a negative e®ect of First Mover e®ort on Second Mover e®ort. In more detail, at low
prizes First Mover e®ort does not signi¯cantly a®ect Second Mover e®ort, while at high prizes
there is a large and signi¯cant discouragement e®ect as predicted by our theory of disappointment
aversion. Application of the Delta method reveals that the e®ect of First Mover e®ort on Second
Mover e®ort is not signi¯cant at the 5% level for prizes less than $2, is signi¯cant at the 5% level
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for prizes between $2 and $2.60, and is signi¯cant at the 1% level for prizes of $2.70 and above.
For the highest prize of $3.90 a 10 slider increase in First Mover e®ort decreases Second Mover
e®ort by approximately 1.5 sliders. Furthermore, there are large and signi¯cant positive prize
e®ects, and we ¯nd that the persistent unobserved individual characteristics explain more of the
variation in behavior than the transitory unobservables. The round dummies reveal signi¯cant
increases in e®ort over the 10 rounds which we interpret as a reduction in the marginal cost of
e®ort due to learning-by-doing.
Additional regressions, not reported, allow the coe±cients on First Mover e®ort, the prize
and the interaction of these two variables to di®er between men and women. No signi¯cant
gender di®erences were found. This suggests that Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)'s ¯nding that
men have a stronger preference for competition compared to women cannot be explained by
di®erential levels of disappointment aversion across gender when agents compete.
We note that, although the parameters reported in Table 2 were estimated from a linear
random e®ects model, an alternative speci¯cation in which round invariant Second Mover speci¯c
e®ects are treated as ¯xed e®ects yields almost indistinguishable results. This is because Second
Mover speci¯c e®ects are uncorrelated with the prize and the First Mover e®orts due to the
experimental design. Finally, Table 2 shows that including the 60th Second Mover does not
change conclusions concerning signi¯cance, and nor does this have substantial e®ects on the
coe±cient estimates.
4.3 Structural Modeling
Structural modeling seeks to ¯t the theoretical model with disappointment aversion presented
above in Section 3.3 to the experimental sample. In contrast to the reduced form analysis above,
structural modeling recovers estimates of the strength of disappointment aversion on average and
the population-level heterogeneity in disappointment aversion. Below we describe the empirical
speci¯cation, the estimation strategy, including a discussion of identi¯cation, and the results.
4.3.1 Empirical Speci¯cation
We use ¸2;n to denote the disappointment aversion parameter of the nth Second Mover. In this
speci¯cation the strength of disappointment aversion may vary between subjects; however, for
a given subject the strength of disappointment is constant over rounds. We adopt the following
speci¯cation for ¸2;n:
¸2;n » N(e¸2; ¾2¸) for n = 1; : : : ; N; (12)
and further assume that ¸2;n is independent over Second Movers. The parameter e¸2 represents
the strength of disappointment aversion on average, and ¾2¸ denotes the variance of the strength
of disappointment aversion in the population.
The cost of e®ort function is assumed to be quadratic, as in (9). The parameter b is assumed
to be constant over rounds and common to Second Movers, while unobserved cost di®erences
between Second Movers and learning e®ects enter the cost of e®ort function through the con-
vexity parameter c. cn;r denotes the convexity parameter of the nth Second Mover in the rth
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round and takes the following form:
cn;r = ·+ ±r + ¹n + ¼n;r for n = 1; : : : ; N ; r = 1; :::; 10: (13)
In the above · denotes the component of cn;r which is common across Second Movers and
rounds. ±r for r = 1; :::; 10 are round e®ects, with the ¯rst paying round providing the omitted
category. A cost of e®ort that is declining over rounds due to learning is therefore represented by
values of ±r which are negative and decreasing over rounds. ¹n denotes unobserved di®erences
in the cost of e®ort functions across Second Movers that are constant over rounds. For the
purpose of estimation ¹n is assumed to be independent over Second Movers and to have a
Weibull distribution with scale parameter Á¹ and shape parameter '¹. The ¯nal term in the
cost function is ¼n;r which represents unobserved di®erences in Second Movers' cost of e®ort
functions that vary over rounds as well as over Second Movers. ¼n;r is assumed to be independent
over Second Movers and rounds and to have a Weibull distribution with scale parameter Á¼ and
shape parameter '¼. The Weibull distribution is a °exible two parameter distribution that has
positive support, thus allowing us to impose convex cost of e®ort functions on all Second Movers
when estimating the model.20
Given this parameterization of the theoretical model, the structural model has 17 unknown
parameters, corresponding to the parameters describing disappointment aversion, e¸2 and ¾¸, the
common cost parameters b and ·, the 9 round e®ects ±r for r = 2; :::; 10 and the 4 parameters
appearing in the distribution of the unobservables in the cost of e®ort function, namely, Á¹, '¹,
Á¼ and '¼. These 17 structural parameters are collectively denoted by the vector µ.
4.3.2 Estimation Strategy and Identi¯cation
We estimate the 17 unknown parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) (Mc-
Fadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989). The analytic complexity of choice probabilities, due
to the multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity, precludes the use of Maximum Likelihood
and Method of Moments estimation techniques. MSM, in contrast, uses easily computed fea-
tures of the sample as the basis for estimating the unknown parameters. Formally, the sample
observations are used to compute a k£ 1 dimensional vector of moments, with k ¸ 17, denoted
M . Critically, every moment included in M should depend at least in part on one or more
endogenous variables. The researcher has considerable discretion over the moments included in
M ; however M typically includes period speci¯c averages of endogenous variables, here the e®ort
choices of the Second Movers in each round, together with correlations between the endogenous
variables and the explanatory variables.
MSM proceeds by generating S simulated samples. Each simulated sample contains N
Second Movers each observed for 10 rounds. In each simulated sample the Second Movers face
the same prizes and First Mover e®orts as observed in the actual sample. The behavior of the
Second Movers in the simulated samples is determined from the structural model using a trial
value, µt, of the values of the unknown parameters, µ. In particular, unobservables are assigned
to Second Movers in accordance with the above described distributions. For each Second Mover
20In Section 4.3.3 we show that replacing the Weibull distribution with the normal distribution reduces the
model's goodness of ¯t.
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and each round, the expected utility is calculated for each feasible Second Mover e®ort choice,
and the simulated e®ort choice is the action with the highest expected utility. Further details
concerning the construction of the simulated samples are provided in Appendix B.1.
The behavior of the Second Movers in the simulated samples is then compared to the behavior
of the actual experimental subjects. Speci¯cally, for each of the S simulated samples the vector
of moments Ms(µt) is computed. These are the same k moments as computed for the observed
sample. The simulated moments Ms are a function of the parameters µt used to simulate the
behavior of the Second Movers as di®erent values of the parameters imply di®erent optimal
Second Mover e®ort choices. The average of Ms over the S simulated samples, 1S
PS
s=1 Ms(µt),
provides a summary of the behavior of Second Movers in the simulated samples. The process of
averaging over the S simulated samples reduces the e®ect of simulation noise on the simulated
moments. The following metric is then formed:
J(µt) =
Ã
M ¡ 1S
SX
s=1
Ms(µt)
!0
WN
Ã
M ¡ 1S
SX
s=1
Ms(µt)
!
; (14)
where WN is a ¯xed k £ k dimensional positive semide¯nite weighting matrix. The quantity
J(µt) provides a scalar measure of the distance between the observed behavior of the actual
experimental subjects and the behavior of the Second Movers in the simulated samples at the
trial parameter vector µt. The MSM estimator of µ, denoted bµ, is the value of µt that minimizes
J(µt): bµ = argminµtJ(µt). Thus MSM estimates the structural parameters to be such that the
behavior of Second Movers simulated on the basis of the structural model is as similar as possible
to the behavior of the actual Second Movers as observed in sample.
Under the conditions of Pakes and Pollard (1989), the MSM estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normal for any consistent weight matrix WN . We use bootstrap sampling of
Second Movers with replacement to estimate WN . E±ciency is maximized by setting WN to be
the inverse of N times the covariance matrix of the sample moments, which yields an Optimally
Weighted Minimum Distance estimator (OWMD). However, it is well known that this choice
of WN can introduce ¯nite sample bias (see for example Altonji and Segal, 1996). Thus our
preferred estimator uses a weight matrix with diagonal elements equal to the inverse of N times
the variances of the sample moments and zeros elsewhere, which yields a Diagonally Weighted
Minimum Distance estimator (DWMD). Further details pertaining to the properties of the MSM
estimator and estimation routine are presented in Appendix B.2.
We use 38 moments to estimate the 17 structural parameters. The moments are described in
Table 4 in Appendix B.3. Correlations between Second Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort and
between Second Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort interacted with the prize provide identifying
information about e¸2, the parameter describing the strength of disappointment aversion on av-
erage. Percentiles of Second Mover speci¯c correlations provide information about the standard
deviation of disappointment aversion in the population, ¾¸. The correlation between Second
Mover e®ort and the prize helps to identify ·, which measures the component of the convexity
of the cost of e®ort function common to Second Movers and rounds, while the associated per-
centiles help to identify the shape of the distributions of the unobserved cost di®erences between
Second Movers. Moments pertaining to the marginal distribution of Second Mover e®ort, such
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as round speci¯c means and the standard deviation, provide further identifying information.
4.3.3 Results
Preferred Spec. Robustness Checks
DWMD OWMD DWMD DWMD
59 Second Movers 59 Second Movers 59 Second Movers 60 Second Movers
Weibull Costs Weibull Costs Normal Costs Weibull Costs
e¸2 1:724(0:479)[0:000] 1:497(0:258)[0:000] 1:199(0:347)[0:001] 1:409(0:323)[0:000]
¾¸ 1:433(0:492)[0:004] 1:153(0:154)[0:000] 1:298(0:308)[0:000] 1:508(0:455)[0:001]
b ¡0:532
(0:033)[0:000]
¡0:566
(0:013)[0:000]
¡0:522
(0:017)[0:000]
¡0:506
(0:017)[0:000]
· 1:868
(0:095)[0:000]
2:069
(0:037)[0:000]
2:568
(0:053)[0:000]
1:808
(0:074)[0:000]
±2 ¡0:162
(0:043)[0:000]
¡0:198
(0:033)[0:000]
¡0:163
(0:034)[0:000]
¡0:171
(0:056)[0:000]
±3 ¡0:265
(0:040)[0:000]
¡0:313
(0:030)[0:000]
¡0:321
(0:050)[0:000]
¡0:301
(0:059)[0:000]
±4 ¡0:314
(0:051)[0:000]
¡0:332
(0:032)[0:000]
¡0:344
(0:031)[0:000]
¡0:306
(0:074)[0:000]
±5 ¡0:315
(0:040)[0:000]
¡0:394
(0:032)[0:000]
¡0:341
(0:063)[0:000]
¡0:285
(0:072)[0:000]
±6 ¡0:290
(0:050)[0:000]
¡0:379
(0:040)[0:000]
¡0:315
(0:054)[0:000]
¡0:276
(0:076)[0:000]
±7 ¡0:363
(0:049)[0:000]
¡0:444
(0:031)[0:000]
¡0:394
(0:048)[0:000]
¡0:352
(0:067)[0:000]
±8 ¡0:411
(0:046)[0:000]
¡0:431
(0:029)[0:000]
¡0:431
(0:043)[0:000]
¡0:413
(0:063)[0:000]
±9 ¡0:390
(0:063)[0:000]
¡0:465
(0:039)[0:000]
¡0:436
(0:052)[0:000]
¡0:379
(0:063)[0:000]
±10 ¡0:449
(0:046)[0:000]
¡0:548
(0:028)[0:000]
¡0:493
(0:035)[0:000]
¡0:435
(0:058)[0:000]
Á¼ 0:322(0:064)[0:000] 0:164(0:015)[0:000] ¡ 0:211(0:048)[0:000]
Á¹ 0:436(0:035)[0:000] 0:529(0:036)[0:000] ¡ 0:504(0:058)[0:000]
'¼ 1:016(0:118)[0:000] 0:660(0:034)[0:000] ¡ 0:809(0:069)[0:000]
'¹ 0:918(0:086)[0:000] 1:163(0:031)[0:000] ¡ 0:948(0:082)[0:000]
¾¼ 0:320(0:050)[0:000] 0:356(0:034)[0:000] 0:207(0:021)[0:000] 0:307(0:067)[0:000]
¾¹ 0:493(0:048)[0:000] 0:432(0:032)[0:000] 0:290(0:019)[0:000] 0:552(0:108)[0:000]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and p values in brackets. Standard deviations of the
transitory and persistent unobservables in the cost of e®ort function, ¾¼ and ¾¹, are estimated
directly in the speci¯cation using normally distributed unobservables and computed from the
other parameters for the speci¯cations using the Weibull distribution. Estimates of ·, ±r for
r = 2; : : : 10, Á¼ and Á¹ have been multiplied by 100.
Table 3: MSM parameter estimates.
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The ¯rst column of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for the preferred speci¯cation,
which is based on the sample of 59 Second Movers, assumes Weibull distributed unobservables
in the cost of e®ort function and relies on a diagonal weight matrix. Before discussing the results
we brie°y consider the goodness of ¯t of this speci¯cation represented by the relevant moments
in Table 5 located in Appendix B.3. Table 5 shows that for this speci¯cation all simulated
moments correspond closely to the values observed in the sample: in particular the observed
and simulated moments never di®er by more than 1.3 bootstrapped standard deviations.
Turning to the parameter estimates for the preferred speci¯cation in the ¯rst column of
Table 3, our estimate of the strength of disappointment aversion on average, e¸2, is 1.724 and
this is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at all conventional signi¯cance levels. In Section 4.4.2
we place this estimate in the context of the related literature but we note here that a ¯gure
of 1.724 is in line with previous studies which estimate the strength of loss aversion around a
¯xed reference point. We ¯nd that ¾¸ is signi¯cantly greater than zero, thus providing evidence
for heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across individuals. Our parameter estimates imply
that ¸2;n is greater than 2.9 for 20% of individuals, and is less than 0.5 for 20%. For 11% of
individuals, ¸2;n is less than zero.
The results further show that the cost of e®ort function exhibits signi¯cant convexity, and
learning e®ects work to reduce the convexity of the cost of e®ort over rounds, leading to higher
average e®ort levels in later rounds. In addition there is signi¯cant transitory and permanent
variation over Second Movers in the cost of e®ort, with persistent unobserved di®erences being
more important than transitory di®erences. Our estimate of b, the linear component of the
cost of e®ort function, is negative, indicating that the cost of e®ort is declining at low e®ort
levels. This negative coe±cient is required to ¯t accurately observed average Second Mover
e®ort. However, the linear component of the cost of e®ort function does not a®ect how Second
Movers respond to the First Movers' e®orts. Moreover, it is not surprising that the cost of
e®ort is at ¯rst declining as the experimental subjects have self-selected into participating in
the experiment and the outside option during the task is to do nothing for 120 seconds. Other
experiments have also found that subjects derive some utility from carrying out real e®ort tasks,
e.g., BrÄuggen and Strobel (2007).
Next we explore how the disappointment aversion impacts on the e®ort choices of the Second
Movers and in particular look at how Second Movers responds to First Mover e®ort. Figure 3(a)
shows the mean best response of Second Movers with the average value of ¸2;n to the e®ort
choice of the First Mover.21 We see strong negative e®ects of First Mover e®ort on Second
Mover e®ort at prizes of $2 and $3:90 and essentially no e®ect at the lowest prize of $0:10.
Standard errors, not reported, show that the slope of the reaction function is signi¯cantly neg-
21Reaction functions were obtained using simulation methods. Speci¯cally, we consider a large number of
hypothetical Second Movers, and for each hypothetical Second Mover made draws from the estimated distributions
of ¹n and ¼n;r for the preferred speci¯cation. Using the estimated parameters of the cost of e®ort function for
round 5, we simulated each hypothetical Second Mover's optimal e®ort conditional on speci¯c values of First
Mover e®ort and the prize, and computed the mean best response. Reaction functions were obtained by repeating
this exercise while varying First Mover e®ort but holding the prize ¯xed. Reaction functions are linear and this
is a consequence of the quadratic cost of e®ort function.
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ative (at the 1% level) at prizes of $2 and $3:90.22 Figure 3(b) meanwhile shows the extent
to which heterogeneity in disappointment aversion translates into di®erences in mean Second
Mover responses to First Mover e®ort, evaluated at the average prize of $2. Second Movers with
low values of ¸2;n, de¯ned to be the 20th percentile of the distribution of ¸2;n, do not respond
appreciably to changes in First Mover e®ort. In contrast, a discouragement e®ect is observed for
Second Movers with high values of ¸2;n, de¯ned to be the 80th percentile of the distribution of
¸2;n. Standard errors, not reported, show that the slope of the reaction function is signi¯cantly
negative (at the 1% level) for Second Movers with high values of ¸2;n.
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Figure 3: Reaction functions implied by the preferred speci¯cation of the structural model.
Columns 2-4 of Table 3 provide robustness checks for various features of our analysis. We
see that irrespective of the choice of sample, the method of weighting the moments and the
distributional assumptions imposed on the cost of e®ort function, our estimate of the strength of
disappointment aversion on average e¸2 is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Also, all speci¯cations
show signi¯cant variation across individuals in the strength of disappointment aversion. The
OWMD and DWMD estimators give similar parameter estimates: thus there is little evidence
that using the optimal weight matrix introduces ¯nite sample bias. However we err on the side of
caution and do not nominate this as our preferred speci¯cation. We also estimate a speci¯cation
in which the unobservables appearing in the cost of e®ort function are normally distributed,
rather than being drawn fromWeibull distributions. While reducing by 2 the number of unknown
parameters, the normal distribution is more restrictive than the Weibull, and leads to concave
cost of e®ort functions for subjects with low cost draws.23 Table 5 shows that using the DWMD
estimator with normally distributed unobservables in the cost of e®ort function ¯ts less well
than the preferred speci¯cation: the individual moments reveal that the deterioration in ¯t
occurs as this speci¯cation does not ¯t as accurately the distribution of Second Mover e®orts.
Speci¯cally, the standard deviations of observed and simulated Second Mover e®orts di®er by
22The magnitudes of the estimated slopes are lower than the corresponding estimates implied by the reduced
form analysis in Section 4.2. This is because MSM seeks to ¯t simultaneously a variety of di®erent moments. If
we arbitrarily put a higher weight on the moments identifying these slopes, the estimated magnitudes would be
larger.
23When estimating the speci¯cation with normally distributed unobservables in the cost of e®ort function we
replace cn;r with maxfcn;r; 0:0001g.
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2.3 bootstrapped standard deviations, while the proportions of very low and very high simulated
Second Mover e®orts are, respectively, 2.8 and 1.8 bootstrapped standard deviations di®erent
from the corresponding proportions observed in the sample. Increasing the sample size to 60
Second Movers also leads to a larger discrepancy between the standard deviations of observed
and simulated Second Mover e®orts than that obtained from the preferred speci¯cation.
4.4 Endogenous Reference Points
4.4.1 Evidence
Given that we model disappointment aversion as loss aversion around an agent's endogenous
expectation, our ¯nding of signi¯cant disappointment aversion provides evidence of loss aversion
around choice-acclimating reference points when agents compete. With a ¯xed reference point,
including one given by a prior expectation, Proposition 1 shows that we should observe no
discouragement e®ect, and no disappointment de¯cit term appears in the expression for expected
utility.
Thus our results speak to the debate about the speed at which reference points adjust.
K}oszegi and Rabin (2007) note that it is unclear how much time is needed between agents mak-
ing their choices and the outcome occurring for the reference point to become choice-acclimating.
Given the tiny temporal gap between the agents' e®ort choices and the outcome of the tourna-
ment, our results indicate that, at least in our competitive framework, the adjustment process
is essentially instantaneous.
4.4.2 Relationship to Existing Estimates of Loss Aversion
The endogeneity of the reference point means that behavior in our model is driven by the
size of the kink in gain-loss utility ¸2 = l2 ¡ g2. Other models of choice-acclimating reference
points share the same feature. To see this, we introduce K}oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)'s
parameterization, which involves a weighting on gain-loss utility relative to material utility,
´ ¸ 0, and a coe±cient of loss aversion for gain-loss utility, ¸, which measures the ratio of the
slopes of gain-loss utility alone in the loss and gain domains. We estimate the size of the kink in
gain-loss utility, scaled relative to material utility, and ¸2 = ´¸¡´ = ´(¸¡1). In their model of
single-agent e®ort provision, Abeler et al. (2009)'s ¯rst-order conditions also depend on ´(¸¡1),
as do preferences over lotteries in the choice-acclimating version of K}oszegi and Rabin (2007)'s
model (see p. 1059 and Proposition 12(i)). Bell (1985)'s original disappointment aversion model
also builds on the size of the kink. We cannot estimate ¸ directly, as this coe±cient interacts
with the weight put on gain-loss utility to determine the size of the kink in gain-loss utility;
nonetheless, because we estimate that e¸2 > 0, it follows that ´ > 0 and ¸ > 1.24
Our measure of disappointment aversion is therefore not directly comparable to previous
measures of loss aversion around ¯xed reference points. Evidence from previous studies suggests
a coe±cient of loss aversion of about 2 for Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s value function
(Kahneman, 2003), i.e., the value function is about twice as steep in the loss domain as it is
in the gain domain. For example, from choices over lotteries Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
24Even though their reference point is ¯xed at the point of optimization, Crawford and Meng (2009) are also
unable to separately identify ¸ and ´.
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estimate a coe±cient of 2.25 for their median subject. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s value
function is de¯ned only over gains and losses: if we consider this value function to include
implicitly any consumption value of losses and gains as well as psychological elation and pain
from deviating from the reference point, then the comparable ¯gure in our setting to the usual
loss aversion coe±cient is the ratio of the slopes of total utility in the loss and gain domains,
given by
1 + l2
1 + g2 = 1 +
¸2
1 + g2 : (15)
Given an assumption about g2, our estimate of e¸2 therefore implies an estimate of the average
value of (15) in the population. For example, if we assume that g2 2 (0; 1), so the elation
associated with receiving more than expected is positive but less important than the associated
material utility, then our estimate e¸2 = 1:724 implies that (15) 2 (1:862; 2:724). This matches
previous estimates of the coe±cient of loss aversion, and is broadly in line with Crawford and
Meng (2009)'s baseline estimate of the ratio of the slopes of total utility in the loss and gain
domains of 1.715 in the context of the loss aversion of taxi drivers around rational expectations-
based daily income and hours targets which are ¯xed at the point of optimization.
5 Conclusion
People compete all the time, e.g., for: promotions; bonuses; professional partnerships; elected
positions; social status; and sporting trophies. In these situations the competitors exert e®ort
to improve their prospects of success, and clear winners and losers emerge. Our results indicate
that winners are elated while losers are disappointed, and that disappointment is the stronger
emotion. In particular, we show that when our experimental subjects compete in a sequential-
move real e®ort competition, they are loss averse around an endogenous reference point given
by their expected payo®. A person's reference point is conditioned on her own work e®ort and
that of her rival, and adjusts essentially instantaneously to the e®ort choices. Disappointment
aversion creates a discouragement e®ect, whereby a competitor slacks o® when her rival works
hard.
We hope that our theoretical model and empirical ¯ndings will provide a useful building
block when predicting how people will behave in competitive situations. Furthermore, the
¯ndings may be helpful to principals when designing competitive environments. For example,
employers will want to know how much they need to compensate employees for the expected
disappointment implicit in di®erent types of compensation schemes. They will also be interested
in the degree to which a given compensation structure might impact on employees' work e®orts,
for example by creating asymmetries with some employees exerting a lot of e®ort and others
becoming discouraged.
Finally, we believe that the novel real e®ort slider task we developed for the purposes of
this study will prove valuable to researchers running real e®ort experiments in other settings in
which precise quanti¯cation of preference and cost parameters is important.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (1) and (7),
EU2(e2; e1) = v
µe2 ¡ e1 + °
2°
¶
¡ ¸2v
µ°2 ¡ (e2 ¡ e1)2
4°2
¶
¡ C2(e2): (16)
We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that when e1 increases from e11 to e12 > e11, the
Second Mover's optimal e®ort e¤2 increases from e¤21 to e¤22 > e¤21. By the optimality of the
Second Mover's e®ort choices
[EU2(e¤21; e11)¡ EU2(e¤22; e11)] + [EU2(e¤22; e12)¡ EU2(e¤21; e12)] ¸ 0: (17)
Using (16), we get the following:
EU2(e¤21; e11)¡EU2(e¤21; e12) = v
µ¡e11 + e12
2°
¶
+ ¸2v
µ(e¤21 ¡ e11)2 ¡ (e¤21 ¡ e12)2
4°2
¶
; (18)
EU2(e¤22; e12)¡EU2(e¤22; e11) = v
µ¡e12 + e11
2°
¶
+ ¸2v
µ(e¤22 ¡ e12)2 ¡ (e¤22 ¡ e11)2
4°2
¶
: (19)
Thus
(17) = ¸2v2°2 (¡e
¤
21e11 + e¤21e12 ¡ e¤22e12 + e¤22e11) =
¸2v
2°2 (e
¤
21 ¡ e¤22)(e12 ¡ e11) < 0 (20)
given ¸2 > 0 for a disappointment averse Second Mover, which contradicts (17) ¸ 0 from above.
Note that if there are multiple optima, the proof extends naturally to show that the highest
optimal e®ort in response to e12 must lie weakly below the lowest in response to e11.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Using (9) and (16),
@EU2(e2; e1)
@e2 =
v
2° +
¸2v(e2 ¡ e1)
2°2 ¡ b¡ ce2; (21)
@2EU2(e2; e1)
@e22
= ¸2v2°2 ¡ c: (22)
We assume that 2°2c¡ ¸2v > 0, so the objective function is strictly concave.
Suppose ¯rst that the action space A is continuous. The ¯rst-order condition gives the
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following reaction function:
e¤2(e1) =
8
>><
>>:
e if e1 < °v+¸2ve¡2°
2(b+ce)
¸2v
°v¡¸2ve1¡2°2b
2°2c¡¸2v 2 [0; e] if e1 2
h°v+¸2ve¡2°2(b+ce)
¸2v ;
°v¡2°2b
¸2v
i
0 if e1 > °v¡2°
2b
¸2v
: (23)
Given ¸2 > 0 and 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0, in the interior de
¤
2
de1 is clearly strictly negative and strictly
decreasing in ¸2 and v.
Suppose second that the action space A is discrete. Take any e2 2 A for which there exists
a higher e®ort which is a best response to some e1 2 [0; e] and a lower e®ort with the same
property. Let e+2 be the next highest e®ort in A and let e¡2 be the next lowest e®ort in A. Using
(9) and (16), EU2(e+2 ; e1)¡EU2(e2; e1)
= v(e
+
2 ¡ e2)
2° + ¸2v
µ(e+2 ¡ e1)2 ¡ (e2 ¡ e1)2
4°2
¶
¡ b(e+2 ¡ e2)¡
c((e+2 )2 ¡ e22)
2 (24)
= (2°v ¡ 4°
2b)(e+2 ¡ e2)
4°2 +
µ¸2v ¡ 2°2c
4°2
¶
((e+2 )2 ¡ e22)¡
µ¸2v
4°2
¶
2e1(e+2 ¡ e2): (25)
The cut-o® e1 at which EU2(e+2 ; e1) = EU2(e2; e1) is given by
e¸1(e+2 ; e2) =
2°v ¡ 4°2b
2¸2v ¡
µ2°2c¡ ¸2v
¸2v
¶µe+2 + e2
2
¶
: (26)
Given ¸2 > 0 and 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0 by assumption, the cut-o®s are strictly decreasing in the
Second Mover's e®ort. From Proposition 2, best responses are (weakly) falling in e1. Thus if e1
was continuous but e2 was discrete, the cut-o®s would represent the points at which the Second
Mover's reaction function jumped down. As both are discrete, the cut-o®s de¯ne the Second
Mover's reaction function in the interior: e2 is a best response for the Second Mover for and
only for any e1 2 [e¸1(e+2 ; e2); e¸1(e2; e¡2 )] \ A. The range [e¸1(e+2 ; e2); e¸1(e2; e¡2 )] is of size
e¸1(e2; e¡2 )¡ e¸1(e+2 ; e2) =
µ2°2c¡ ¸2v
¸2v
¶µe+2 ¡ e¡2
2
¶
; (27)
which is strictly decreasing in ¸2 and v.
That the cut-o®s are strictly decreasing in e2 is the discrete case analogue of the reaction
function being strictly downward sloping in the continuous case. That the size of the ranges
between the cut-o®s is strictly decreasing in ¸2 and v is the discrete case analogue of the reaction
function becoming strictly steeper in ¸2 and v in the continuous case. Note also the functional
form similarity: supposing that the permitted e2's increase in unit steps, e
+
2 +e2
2 = e2 + 12 , so the
rate of change of e¸1(e+2 ; e2) with respect to e2 is the inverse of the slope of the reaction function
in the continuous case.
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B MSM: Further Details
B.1 Construction of Simulated Samples
The construction of each simulated sample is conditional on the First Mover e®orts and prizes
observed in the actual sample. Additionally we make random draws which will later be used to
construct the unobservables appearing in the structural model. Speci¯cally, for each simulated
sample s = 1; : : : ; S we construct matrices of dimensions N £1, N £1 and N £10, denoted Q1s,
Q2s and Q3s respectively. Each element of Q1s, Q2s and Q3s contains a random draw from
a standard uniform distribution. These matrices are held ¯xed throughout the estimation.25
Given a trial parameter vector µt, the e®ort choice of the nth Second Mover in the rth round of
the sth sample is determined as follows:
1. The Second Mover is assigned values of the unobservables ¸2;n, ¹n and ¼n;r in accor-
dance with the distributional assumptions made in Section 4.3.1. Draws from the normal
distribution are found by transforming Q1s as follows:
¸2;n = e¸2 + ¾¸©¡1(Q1s;n); (28)
where ©¡1 denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. Draws from
the Weibull distribution are obtained by transforming Q2s and Q3s as follows:
¹n = Á¹(¡ ln(Q2s;n))1='¹ ; (29)
¼n;r = Á¼(¡ ln(Q3s;n;r))1='¼ : (30)
The values of the parameters e¸2, ¾¸, '¹, '¼, Á¹ and Á¼ are obtained by extracting the
relevant elements of µt.
2. Given the assigned values of ¸2;n, ¹n and ¼n;r and the remaining parameters of the cost of
e®ort function, b, · and ±r for r = 2; : : : ; 10 as given by µt, the expected utility associated
with each feasible Second Mover e®ort is computed using (7), (9) and (13).
3. The Second Mover is assigned the e®ort choice corresponding to the highest expected
utility.
Steps 1-3 are repeated for each of the 10 rounds, the N Second Movers and the S simulated sam-
ples. Note that by comparing the expected utilities associated with each of the 49 feasible e®ort
choices we fully account for the discreteness of e®ort. Additionally, the method of simulation
does not rely on the objective function being well behaved.
25Thus as the trial parameter vector µt is adjusted the simulated samples vary only due to the change in µt and
not due to variation in the underlying random draws. This is necessary to ensure convergence of the estimation
routine (Stern, 1997).
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B.2 Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods
Under the conditions in Pakes and Pollard (1989), bµ is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Speci¯cally, with S ¯xed,
p
N(bµ ¡ µ) d¡! N
µ
0; S + 1S
¡D0WD¢¡1 D0W­WD ¡D0WD¢¡1
¶
as N !1; (31)
where ­ = Ncov(M) is the covariance matrix of the sample moments normalized by the sample
size, W = plim(WN ) and
D = 1S
SX
s=1
dMs(µt)
dµ0t
¯¯
¯¯
¯
µt=µ
: (32)
When implementing MSM, we use S = 30 simulated samples and therefore simulate 17700
pairings when using N = 59, and we estimate the weight matrix WN using 5000 bootstrapped
samples each containing N Second Movers sampled with replacement from the original sample.
The term 1S
SP
s=1
Ms(µt) appearing in J(µt) in (14) is not a continuous function of the parameter
vector µt as small changes in µt may cause discrete changes in some Second Movers' optimal
e®ort choices. Consequently gradient and Hessian based optimization methods are unsuitable
for minimizing J(µt). Instead we use Simulated Annealing in the form suggested by Go®e et al.
(1994) to solve for the MSM estimates.
B.3 Moments and Goodness of Fit
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C Experimental Instructions
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the four page
instructions sheet which you will ¯nd in your brown envelope. [Open brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses for you to ask
questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Apart
from asking questions in this way, you must not communicate with anybody in this room. Please
now turn o® mobile phones and any other electronic devices. These must remain turned o® for
the duration of this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the card you
selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer booths at any time
during this session. As you came in you also selected a white sealed envelope. Please now open
your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
Each white envelope contains a di®erent four digit Participant ID number. To ensure
anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID number and at the
end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number. You will be paid a show up fee
of $4 together with any money you accumulate during this session. The amount of money you
accumulate will depend partly on your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on
chance. All payments will be made in cash in another room. Neither I nor any of the other
participants will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID number. [Enter
four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your Participant ID number to its
envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID number will be required for payment at the
end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid, followed by 10
paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake an identical task lasting
120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned
at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current
position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. Your \points score" in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are there any
questions?
Before the ¯rst practice round, you will discover whether you are a \First Mover" or a
\Second Mover". You will remain either a First Mover or a Second Mover for the entirety of
this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and the other
will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task ¯rst, and then the Second
Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see the First Mover's points score before
starting the task.
In each paying round, there will be a prize which one pair member will win. Each pair's
prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between $0.10 and
$3.90. The winner of the prize will depend on the di®erence between the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's points scores and some element of chance. If the points scores are the same,
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each pair member will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the
same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1
percentage point for every increase of 1 in the di®erence between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly decreases
by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning
for any points score di®erence. Please look at this table now. [Look at table] Are there any
questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen,
including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a First Mover or a Second
Mover, the prize for the round and your points score in the task so far. If you are a Second
Mover, you will also see the points score of the First Mover you are paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will see a summary
screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's points score, their probability
of winning, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or the loser of the round.
We will now start the ¯rst of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds, you will be
paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start, are there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the second practice
round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now. [Second practice round]
Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are ¯nished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds. In every
paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The pairings will be changed
after every round and pairings will not depend on your previous actions. You will not be paired
with the same person twice. Furthermore, the pairings are done in such a way that the actions
you take in one round cannot a®ect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later
rounds. This also means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round
cannot be a®ected by your actions in earlier rounds. (If you are interested, this is because you
will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired with you,
and you will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired
with someone who had been paired with you, and so on.) Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the rounds.
Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions? There will be no further
opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up fee, is displayed
on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to do so to receive your payment.
Remember to bring the envelope containing your four digit Participant ID number with you but
please leave all other materials on your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Di®erence in Chance of winning prize Chance of winning prize
points scores for Mover with higher score for Mover with lower score
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
Table 6: Chance of winning in a given round.
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